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A DIALOGUE ON HATE SPEECH 
ARNOLD H. LOEWY∗ 
 Americans and Europeans have very different ideas of the 
strength of their respective free speech guarantees. In an article by 
Professors Russell Weaver, Nicolas Delpierre, and Laurence Boissier 
on the Gayssot laws of France, we encounter an account of a free 
speech regime that would be an anathema to most Americans.1 In 
this Essay, I explore the different thoughts an American lawyer and 
a European lawyer have to help us understand why arguments that 
are persuasive to lawyers of one country might not be similarly per-
suasive to lawyers from other countries with very different cultures. 
 On an imaginary flight from Frankfurt, Germany, to Washington, 
D.C., two lawyers previously unknown to each other are seated next 
to each other in seats 7A and 7B in the airplane’s business class sec-
tion. The lawyers, Hans Schmidt of Frankfurt and John Smith of 
Washington, introduce themselves, and the following dialogue begins: 
Hans: I understand that in America you construe your con-
stitutional free speech clause to allow anyone to say any-
thing regardless of who might be offended. 
John: Well, that’s basically right, although a bit overstated. 
We don’t constitutionally protect fighting words,2 and we do 
limit the time, place, and manner of speech.3 
Hans: Oh, good. Then you wouldn’t allow such horrible 
things as Holocaust denial or race-baiting hate speech. 
John: No, that’s not right. Both of those types of speech are 
constitutionally protected.4 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗  George R. Killam Jr. Professor of Criminal Law at Texas Tech University School 
of Law. I would like to thank the participants of the First Amendment Symposium, held at 
the University of Louisville School of Law, and the faculty at the University of Mainz for 
their helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank my research assistants, Michael Kirk-
land and Andrew Porter, recent graduates of the Texas Tech School of Law, Katherine 
Binkley, a second year student at Texas Tech School of law, and especially Matthew Ritt-
mayer, a third year student at Texas Tech School of Law, for their helpful assistance. 
 1. Russell Weaver et al., Holocaust Denial and Government Declared “Truth”: French 
and American Perspectives, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 2. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
 3. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 722-26 (2000) (upholding a Colorado stat-
ute as constitutional because the location restriction served a legitimate governmental in-
terest, was content-neutral, and was narrowly tailored); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83, 
85-89 (1949) (noting that noise regulations are not unconstitutional when the restrictions 
protect the public and do not stifle the communication of ideas).  
 4. Because Holocaust denial has never been outlawed in the United States, there are 
no decisions explicitly holding that it could not be outlawed. There is, however, no First 
Amendment theory of which I am familiar that would even arguably allow such a prohibi-
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Hans: But why? I thought I heard you say that fighting 
words are not protected. 
John: I did, but fighting words have to be face-to-face. Thus, 
if one man says to another during a face-to-face dialogue like 
we’re having here, “You’re a no-good dirty faggot”—that 
would constitute fighting words.5 But if he writes a book or 
carries a sign that attacks homosexuals as the cause of all 
that is wrong in America, he could not be punished for       
his words.6 
Hans: And the same goes for race, gender, religion, or any-
thing else? You can insult any group of people with outland-
ish characterizations and be protected by the First Amend-
ment? 
John: That’s right, Hans. 
Hans: But why do you do it? I thought that the United 
States renounced bigotry after the civil rights revolution of 
the 60s. 
John: It did. 
Hans: Well, how can you renounce bigotry and allow consti-
tutionally protected bigoted speech? It seems like a contra-
diction to me. 
John: Where’s the contradiction? 
                                                                                                                     
tion. Race-baiting hate speech is clearly protected. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343, 363-67 (2003) (noting that burning a cross can be protected political speech and in-
validating a Virginia statute that made burning a cross prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386, 392 (1992) (invalidating a St. 
Paul ordinance that prohibited fighting words containing messages of some “bias-
motivated” hatred because the government cannot regulate speech based on the underlying 
message expressed); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45, 448-49 (1969) (overturn-
ing an Ohio statute that punished mere advocacy of violence as applied to Ku Klux Klan 
hate speech).  
 5. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (noting that fighting words include face-to-face 
words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace”). 
 6. Cf. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (invalidating a Georgia law as 
overbroad because it was not limited to face-to-face fighting words). 
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Hans: Well, either you’re for racial justice or you’re against 
it. You can’t piously claim that you are for racial justice and 
allow people to speak against it. That’s blatant hypocrisy.7 
John: And what about your country? You claim that you 
support free speech, but you deny it the only time that it 
matters, namely when people say disgusting or                   
revolting things.8 
Hans: Tell you what, you answer my question first. You tell 
me why what you do isn’t hypocritical. Then I’ll tell you why 
my system isn’t. 
John: Okay, you’re on. Let me give you an illustration from 
one of our cases. Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan 
leader, burned a cross at a Klan rally. During the course of 
that rally, Mr. Brandenburg said, “ ‘Personally I believe the 
nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Is-
                                                                                                                     
 7.  Although this is predominantly a European view, see generally Michel Rosenfeld, 
Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1523, 1549-50, which discussed Germany’s adoption of content-based speech regulation in 
order to repudiate the country’s Nazi past, there are a few American scholars who norma-
tively endorse this position. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 435-49 (arguing that the liberty 
of free speech is in conflict with the elimination of racism and the debate has advanced the 
cause of racial oppression); cf. Mark S. Kende, Regulating Internet Pornography Aimed at 
Children: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective on Passing the Camel Through the 
Needle’s Eye, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1623, 1647-60 (arguing that hate speech should be treated 
as low-value speech). 
 8. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I § 189, available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/stgb/__189.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008), translated in IUS-
Comp, The Comparative Law Society, http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#189 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2008) (“Whoever disparages the memory of a deceased person shall be 
punished with imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine.”); see also Eric Stein, 
History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the ‘Auschwitz’–and Other—
‘Lies’, 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 289 (1986) (discussing the German Penal Code, article 189, 
which deals with disparaging the memory of the dead). Additionally, Germany prohibits 
speech that “assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or 
defaming segments of the population” and punishes such speech “with imprisonment from 
three months to five years.” Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I § 
130, available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/stgb/__130.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008), 
translated in IUSComp, The Comparative Law Society, http://www.iuscomp.org/ 
gla/statutes/StGB.htm#130 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008); see also Friedrich Kübler, How 
Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 342-43 (1998) (discussing the German Penal Code, article 130). 
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rael.’ ”9 The Supreme Court effectively reversed                  
his conviction.10 
Hans: Precisely my point. You allow a speaker to add insult 
to the injury that African Americans were suffering at that 
time in your nation’s history, and you let minorities know 
that it is okay for bigots to spew their hate. What kind of 
message of inclusiveness is that? 
John: You’re missing the whole point. You can say anything 
you want, but you can’t do anything you want. Clarence 
Brandenburg can express his desire for the deportation of 
groups that he finds undesirable. But the government can-
not implement his views. Thus, in the highly unlikely event 
that Brandenburg was able to persuade Congress to enact 
his political agenda, the Supreme Court would declare it un-
constitutional. Hence, there is no possibility that Branden-
burg’s views would ever become the law of the land. 
Hans: Au contraire. Perhaps you are not familiar with Ger-
man history. We allowed Hitler his free speech in the 
streets. Eventually, he was able to take over the govern-
ment, appoint his own judges, and implement a system far 
worse than anything envisaged by Clarence Brandenburg.11  
John: As a matter of fact, you did have repressive speech 
statutes in place under the Weimar Republic when Hitler 
was making his speeches in the streets. You just didn’t 
bother to enforce them.12 Not that I recommend enforcing 
them. What you should have done is to distinguish speech 
from conduct. You should have stopped the Nazis when their 
conduct became intolerable. 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 10. Id. at 448-49. 
 11. See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 97 (1981) (“Re-
peatedly the point is pressed that Hitler’s rise to political power in Germany might have 
been stopped if his early speeches and rallies had been suppressed.”).  
 12. UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN 
SIX COUNTRIES 15-37 (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993). Paragraph 130 of the 
Criminal Code, “Incitement to Class Struggle,” reads as follows: “Whoever publicly incites 
different classes of the population to violent actions against one another in a way that jeop-
ardizes the public peace will be punished with a fine of 600 marks or with a prison term of 
up to two years.” Id. at 16-17. Additionally, Germany had statutes limiting speech with re-
gard to “Religious Insult” (Paragraph 166, Criminal Code) and “Insult” generally (Para-
graphs 185-87, 189, 190, 192-96, Criminal Code). Id. at 17.  
2008]                         A DIALOGUE ON HATE SPEECH 71 
 
 
Hans: That, unfortunately, is easier said than done. 
John: I will grant you that free speech has its risks. If you 
don’t tightly cabin ideas, it is possible that some very bad 
ones will prevail, as unfortunately happened in your coun-
try. But what is the alternative? If some ideas aren’t al-
lowed, one or more government officials have to decide 
which ideas are in and which are out. I don’t trust any such 
official to make that choice for me. 
Hans: What’s the big deal? You don’t have to be a rocket sci-
entist to know that hate speech is beyond the pale. 
John: And who’s going to decide what hate speech is? 
Hans: The trial judge, and if he gets it obviously wrong, the 
appellate court. But frankly, we haven’t had many problems 
with judges reaching wrong verdicts, and when they do, they 
can be fixed like any other mistake.13  
John: I’m not so sure. You guys even consider Holocaust 
deniers to be guilty of hate speech.14 
Hans: Of course we do. Why? Is that a problem? 
John: Sure it is. If people can’t even debate historical facts, 
what happens if somebody discovers evidence that Jesus 
wasn’t really born in Bethlehem,15 or that he didn’t really 
cleanse lepers?16 Are we going to punish the publication of 
that person’s studies because we believe that they are false 
and highly offensive to Christians? 
Hans: That’s different. 
John: How? 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 1548-54 (discussing Germany’s 
Constitutional Court’s reversal of the lower court’s decision in the Tucholsky case, 
interpreting Tucholsky’s bumper sticker with the slogan “soldiers are murderers” as an 
expression of his opinion rather than a defamatory incitement to hatred). 
 14. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I § 130; see Winfried 
Brugger, The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (pt. 1), 3 GERMAN 
L.J. No. 12 (2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=212 (not-
ing that Holocaust denial is not protected speech); cf. Weaver et al., supra note 1 (noting 
that the French Gayssot laws prohibiting Holocaust denial fall under human dignity law 
as opposed to hate speech).  
 15. Despite that Matthew 2:1-6 says he was. 
 16. Despite that Mark 1:40-42 says he did. 
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Hans: Well, we know that Holocaust deniers are wrong. Fur-
thermore, it is excruciatingly painful to Holocaust survivors 
who are still alive. 
John: I see. So one hundred years from now, Holocaust de-
nial will be protected speech, like Christ denial is today. But 
as long as people are sufficiently offended, a contrary view of 
history from that officially espoused is punishable.17 
Hans: Well, I wouldn’t exactly put it that way, but basically 
yes. But tell me, don’t you guys care as to who is hurt or of-
fended by speech in the United States? Do you really want 
to defend scum like Clarence Brandenburg? 
John: Candidly, I wish people like that didn’t exist. It does 
make me sick to listen to them. 
Hans: So why protect them? 
John: Well, there was a time when we didn’t protect hate 
speakers. Back in the 1950s, a man named Joseph Beau-
harnais distributed leaflets filled with hate directed at the 
black race. Beauharnais was seeking people to sign a peti-
tion for his group, the White Circle League, which, so far as 
I can tell, was a white supremacist organization that wanted 
to put blacks in their place: jail, or at least another neigh-
borhood. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction for group 
libel.18 In the course of its opinion, the Court specifically up-
held the denial of his opportunity to prove the truth of his 
remarks on the grounds that even if they were true, they 
were not published with good motives and for                    
justifiable ends.19 
Hans: That sounds pretty good to me. So why did the Court 
jump the rails and stop taking human dignity seriously? 
John: I think that the seeds of Beauharnais’s demise were in 
the dissenting opinion of the case itself. Justice Black omi-
nously warned, “If there be minority groups who hail this 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Germany distinguishes between expressions of opinion and fact. Since the Ger-
man government officially denounces the actions of the Nazi regime and recognizes the 
atrocities committed during the Holocaust, any expression to the contrary is unprotected 
speech and opens the speaker up to criminal liability. See supra notes 8, 14. 
 18. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952).  
 19. Id. at 265-67. 
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holding as their victory, they might consider the possible re-
levancy of this ancient remark: ‘Another such victory and I 
am undone.’ ”20 
Hans: Why on earth would African Americans consider this 
a Pyrrhic victory? Are you telling me that it would be better 
for them to have been allowed to demean whites, rather 
than to be free from being demeaned by whites? That seems 
like a strange set of values to me. 
John: Well, one of the reasons that African Americans do 
have civil rights today is because they fought for them on 
the streets. Led by the great Martin Luther King, Jr., Afri-
can Americans held various sit-in demonstrations through-
out the South. For the most part, their demonstrations were 
deemed constitutionally protected.21 But let us assume that 
the Beauharnais rule had prevailed. I firmly believe that 
Southern judges would have held these demonstrations to be 
libelous to the white race, thereby affirming the conviction 
and jailing of the protestors. 
Hans: Come on now. How could a demand for equality pos-
sibly be deemed libelous?  
John: Because it demeaned the white race by suggesting 
that they were no better than blacks and should be inte-
grated with them. 
Hans: That’s not libel. 
John: Says you and says me. But the judges that populated 
Southern state courts at that time would have thought it 
was libelous.22 And it is, after all, the judges as a branch of 
                                                                                                                     
 20. Id. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 21. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (noting that the First 
Amendment embraces a “right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and 
reproachful presence . . . the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities”). 
 22. See Mary Ellen Maatman, Speaking Truth to Memory: Lawyers and Resistance to 
the End of White Supremacy, 50 HOW. L.J. 1, 28-38 (2006) (describing various “elite Deep 
South . . . judges [who] used a remarkably consistent rhetoric to defend White Suprem-
acy”); Richard N. Winfield, The Wasting Disease and a Cure: Freedom of the Press in 
Emerging Democracies, 20 COMM. LAW. 22, 24-25 (2002) (“During the Civil Rights Move-
ment, the national press . . . covered the upheaval in the American South in a way that 
was powerful and sympathetic to the demonstrators. Throughout the South, white politi-
cians . . . filed countless libel suits against the national press . . . [and] easily convinced 
white judges and all-white juries to impose heavy damages.”); see also A. LEON 
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 127-51 (1996) (describing racism in the courts as a symptom 
and signal of racism in society—“when judges overruled defense objections to . . . racist ac-
tions” they “symbolically were affirming the racist myths and stereotypes”—and stating 
that the segregation of the races in courtrooms, courthouse cafeterias, and restrooms also 
perpetuated racism in and out of the courthouse); cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
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government that make that call. At least it would have been 
if we lived in a regime where hate speech, or speech libelous 
of groups, could be punished. So if the Court had continued 
to follow Beauharnais or the German system seriously, the 
entire civil rights movement may have been significantly re-
tarded. 
Hans: So you think that because a generation ago, a bunch 
of no-nothing judges couldn’t tell the difference between libel 
and legitimate protest, today’s society should have to suffer 
with a rule that subordinates dignitary interest to the pro-
tection of free speech excesses? 
John: No. Not because of that, but as illustrated by that. 
Hans: What do you mean? 
John: It was not because of what adherence to Beauharnais 
did or could have done to the civil rights movement. In fact, 
because we were no longer adhering to Beauharnais,23 the 
harm that I hypothesized never materialized. But that pos-
sibility gives us an important historical retrospective on 
what could happen by trusting judges. Are there judges out 
there today who would deem tomorrow’s conventional wis-
dom so hateful that saying it today can render one a crimi-
nal? Candidly, I don’t know. But, I’m not willing to find out. 
Hans: So, because of the theoretical possibility that some 
judge will wrongly punish an idea, you would let speech pre-
vail over dignity. 
John: It is not so much that the judge would punish the 
wrong idea, although that is surely possible. It is that they 
would punish any idea at all. That is the problem that I 
have with your system. As Mr. Justice Powell once put it, 
“there is no such thing as a false idea.”24  
Hans: Well, I think that Justice Powell was wrong. There 
are false ideas. Unfortunately, my country was governed by 
them during World War II. If we can nip them in the bud, 
everybody wins and nobody, except the purveyor of false 
ideas, loses. 
                                                                                                                     
254, 279-80 (1964) (stating a new libel rule for public officials trying to recover against the 
press—when dealing with a public official there must be proof that the press acted with 
“actual malice”).  
 23. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 229-30, 236-38 (1963) (holding 
that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful 
expression of unpopular views” and reversing the convictions of 187 peaceful protesters 
who demonstrated at the state house and drew a large crowd).  
 24. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
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John: Well, if you trust a government official to distinguish 
good ideas from bad ones, then maybe your system wouldn’t 
be so bad. But, frankly, I don’t have that kind of confidence. 
I trust the marketplace of ideas to distinguish good ideas 
from bad, and if the bad ones occasionally prevail, then that 
is the price of living in a free society. 
Hans: Well, at least we understand our differences. That’s a 
cost I’m not willing to pay. To the extent that an unregu-
lated market on speech allows dignitary interests to be sub-
ordinated to such a simon-pure regime of deregulation, I 
don’t want to be a part of it. 
John: Even at the cost of suppressing a true idea that a 
judge misperceives as false? 
Hans: Yes. Even at the cost of an occasional error such as 
that. 
John: Well, I guess we’re just going to have to agree to dis-
agree on this one. Now let’s talk about the incongruities in 
your system. 
Hans: What incongruities?  
John: Well, you say you believe in free speech. But when the 
speech becomes disagreeable enough, you punish it.25 Let’s 
face it, no government punishes speech that it agrees with 
or is neutral about. In fact, very few governments punish 
mildly distasteful speech. It is only when speech gets really 
bad, like hate speech or Holocaust denial, that any govern-
ment would even want to punish it.26 
Hans: You think so. Take a look at this. (Hans hands John a 
copy of a German newspaper with several stories and edito-
rials highly critical of the German government). 
John: (after reading the articles): So what’s your point? 
Hans: Nobody on this newspaper was prosecuted or threat-
ened with prosecution, because contrary to what you said, 
we do take free speech seriously. 
John: Frankly, I think that any country that calls itself a 
democracy will allow that kind of political attack. To take 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See, e.g., supra notes 8, 14. 
 26. See Arnold H. Loewy, Free Trade in Ideas Is (or Ought to Be) Absolute for Adults, 
2007 BYU L. REV. 1585, 1585 (2007) (suggesting that no democratic government would ev-
er want to punish speech unless they thought it was very harmful).  
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free speech seriously, I think you need to protect more than 
pure political speech.27 
Hans: Oh, really? You guys weren’t always so great. Early 
last century, you sent a former presidential candidate to jail 
for giving an antiwar speech.28 
John: Touché. You are right. Some of our First Amendment 
history is nothing to be proud of.29 But just as you have at-
tempted to shed your image as a Nazi state, we too wanted 
to shed our image as a country where speech is repressed. 
Ironically, to prove how non-Nazi you are, you criminalize 
the support of Nazi ideology.  
Hans: That’s because Nazi ideology is extreme, and we are 
not an extreme country. 
John: And you stay that way by silencing the opposition. 
Hans: Well, shouldn’t we? 
John: Well, the Nazis did that to their opposition. How is 
what you are doing any different? 
Hans: They silenced all of their opposition. We only silence a 
tiny percentage, the lunatic fringe if you will. 
John: So, you don’t believe in free speech for the                 
lunatic fringe? 
Hans: We do believe in free speech. But we also believe in 
moderation. 
John: So you believe in the 90% rule—90% of the speech is 
protected. But the 5% fringes on each side are not. 
Hans: I wouldn’t put it that way. It is more like the 99% 
rule. Maybe ½% at each end of the political scale is limited.30 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See id. at 1585-87 (arguing that speech cannot conflict with other values and that 
people have a right to voice an unpopular opinion, because the safeguards of the Constitu-
tion prevent the idea from being implemented). 
 28. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 213-16 (1919) (affirming the conviction of 
a candidate who expressed his opinion against the war and encouraged opposition from    
the public). 
 29. In addition to Debs, its famous companion case, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 
47 (1919), upheld a conviction for antiwar advocacy directed towards draftees. In addition 
to Beauharnais, a substantially contemporaneous case, Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 
(1951), upheld the conviction of a speaker for little more than refusing to stop speaking on 
the command of a police officer. 
 30. Germany allows all speech with the exception of hate speech or Holocaust denial. 
See Kübler, supra note 8, at 336-38, 340-47 (discussing that while Germany generally fol-
lows the American example of speech regulation, their specific history has led them to pun-
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John: But you still won’t go for 100%. So, if that is what you 
mean by free speech, I can see why you say you believe in it. 
I prefer the 100% rule. Frankly, it’s safer that way. 
Hans: And how is it safer? 
John: We don’t risk squelching a true idea. 
Hans: Like civil rights? 
John: Like civil rights. 
Hans: You are sure trying to get a lot of mileage out of that 
one. 
John: Yes. Because the risk of losing that is not worth all of 
the personal security you think your system gives you. 
Hans: Well, once again we understand our differences. Hey, 
they are about to start the in-flight movie. What’s it about? 
John: It’s called “Taking the First,” starring Beau Bridges 
and Martha Plimpton.31 Ironically, it is about a campus 
speaker who delivers what you might consider an unpro-
tected white supremacist hate speech. Following the speech, 
his followers hunt down and kill a Hispanic heckler, who 
was giving the speaker a hard time. The victim’s parents sue 
the speaker, and the movie explores whether and under 
what circumstances the speaker can be held liable for the 
conduct of his followers. 
Hans: Easy question in Germany. Speaker gave an unpro-
tected speech. Speech proximately caused a death. Speaker 
is liable.32 
John: In America, the question is much harder. The speech 
is generally protected.33 Liability can only be predicated 
upon proof of the speaker’s intent that his followers act ille-
gally. The movie presents a close case, concluding that the 
speaker did cross the line between speech and conduct. The 
                                                                                                                     
ish anti-Semitic speech, Holocaust deniers, and any other hate speech directed against a 
group within Germany). 
 31. THE DEFENDERS: TAKING THE FIRST (Paramount Television 1998). 
 32. See Kübler, supra note 8 at 344-47 (discussing section 130 of the German Penal 
Code—Germany holds speakers liable when they incite hatred against parts of the popula-
tion, which can include speeches and the production and distribution of racist materials by 
print or electronic media).  
 33. See cases cited supra notes 9, 21, 24. 
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good thing about America is that the plaintiff (or prosecutor) 
has to prove that the line has been crossed.34 
Hans: And the good thing about Germany is that he does 
not.35 
John: Well, again, we’ll have to agree to disagree. At least 
we understand our differences. 
Hans: Well, we agree on something anyway, even if it’s just 
understanding where we disagree.  
                                                                                                                     
 34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting that the Constitution 
allows for the advocacy of ideas, and states can only punish individuals when advocacy di-
rectly incites lawless action or conduct).  
 35. See Kübler, supra note 8, at 341 (noting that Germany links speech with conduct 
when prosecuting insulting or defamatory statements made against a person). 
